VEP: A Two-stage Verification Toolchain for Full eBPF Programmability

Abstract

Extended Berkely Package Filter (eBPF) is a revolutionary technology that can safely and efficiently extend kernel capabilities. It has been widely used in networking, tracing, security, and more. However, existing eBPF verifiers impose strict constraints, often requiring repeated modifications to eBPF programs to pass verification. To enhance programmability, we introduce VEP, an annotation-guided eBPF program verification toolchain. VEP consists of three components: VEP-C, a verifier for annotated eBPF-C programs; VEP-compiler, a compiler targeting annotated eBPF bytecode; and VEP-eBPF, a lightweight bytecode-level proof checker. VEP allows users to verify the correctness of their programs with appropriate annotations, thus enabling full programmability. Our experimental results demonstrate that VEP addresses the limitations of existing verifiers, i.e. the Linux verifier and PREVAIL, and provides a more flexible and automated approach to kernel security.

1 Introduction

Recently, eBPF [13] has gained significant popularity as a versatile technique. This innovative technology enables users to load programs into the Linux kernel dynamically, proving to be highly advantageous across various domains, including networking [5, 15, 19, 31, 36, 45],tracing [4, 10], security [9, 12, 25], storage [7, 47, 48], and more. In contrast to traditional Linux kernel modules, eBPF programs offer enhanced stability, as each program undergoes a rigorous verification process before attachment to the kernel. This verifier meticulously screens programs for unsafe behaviors, such as infinite loops and out-of-bound memory access, thus preventing potential crashes.

Existing eBPF verifiers (e.g., the Linux verifier [8] and PREVAIL [28]) often compromise programmability for security, sometimes rejecting safe eBPF programs. The Linux verifier [8] uses *register value tracking* to simulate the execution paths but limits programmability by imposing constraints such as maximum program size and loop complexity to prevent path explosion. PREVAIL [28] addresses this issue using *abstract interpretation* to merge paths, allowing variable-sized loops in eBPF programs. However, when loops involve complex, dynamic behaviors—such as termination conditions dependent on runtime data—PREVAIL's analysis could become imprecise, leading to safe programs being incorrectly rejected.

The eBPF maintainers have acknowledged this issue and have developed methods to mitigate these restrictions on program size and loop complexity. Since kernel version 3.18, the Linux verifier has employed *pruning* to eliminate redundant code paths [3, 8]. Kernel version 5.2 raised the instruction limit from 4096 to 1 million, and version 5.3 added support for bounded loops [1]. In version 5.13, map iterators were introduced to allow iteration through map elements [2], as loops are always unrolled by the verifier, which can lead to excessive code lengths when iterating over large maps. However, map iterators require a function pointer, which, while suited for functional languages, is cumbersome in C. Despite all these ad-hoc features, some safe programs remain impossible to pass the Linux verifier.

In fact, state-of-the-art verification tools possess the potential for full programmability. We broadly categorize modern verification tools into the following three types, depending on their design approaches faced with intricate algorithms, complex program properties, and demand for a high level of automation. (1) Fully automatic verifiers. CBMC [21], a bounded model checker, verifies array bounds, pointer safety, and other properties in C programs

by unrolling loops a fixed number of times. Infer [18], a static analysis tool developed by Facebook, automatically checks memory safety in mobile and server-side code. These tools can automatically handle millions of lines of source codes. But their users have to tolerate false positives and negatives, especially when verifying complex programs with intricate algorithms and data structures. (2) Verifiers based on interactive theorem provers. This method can verify complex programs, but it requires significant manual effort in developing machine-checkable *proof code*. VST [26], as a representative of this type of tools, verifies properties of programs in the theorem prover Coq [6] by requiring users to describe the desired properties and manually write proof code to complete the proof. This approach lacks automation, and the time and memory consumption can be significant [1]. (3) Annotation verifiers based on SMT solver. This approach relies heavily on the SMT solver. VeriFast [33] allows users to provide assertions within the program that describe relevant properties, which are then evaluated by the SMT solver for correctness. Similarly, Dafny [35] leverages the Z3 [16] SMT solver to automate the verification of annotated programs. Unfortunately, even powerful and industry-standard SMT solvers such as Z3 and cvc5 [14] still encounter numerous unsolvable or incorrectly solved problems. Moreover, these SMT solvers are often of considerable scale, requiring substantial amounts of time and memory. In short, it is possible for verification tools to verify complex programs without posing any limitation (i.e. achieve full programmability) but with an additional cost such as requiring users to write annotations. Meanwhile, the tools must make trade-offs among efficiency, resource consumption, and potential false negatives and false positives (see Table 1).

For eBPF verification, the verifier must operate within the kernel, necessitating high efficiency, minimal resource usage, and the absence of false negatives. These requirements imply several constraints: First, despite the advanced capabilities of modern SMT solvers, their overhead and risk of false results make them unsuitable for kernel verification. Second, most eBPF programs are compiled with unverified compilers such as LLVM or GCC. We aim to minimize our Trusted Computing Base (TCB), avoiding including such monolithic components. Finally, verification tools must be highly automated and user-friendly to encourage widespread adoption by eBPF developers in practical settings.

[1]The resource requirements of theorem-prover-based tools, such as VST, vary with implementation. Tools built entirely on theorem provers such as Coq and Isabelle [39] tend to have high time and memory demands, while implementations in languages such as C or Python such as VST-A [49] can greatly reduce these costs.

Inspired by these considerations, we propose **v**erification toolchain for **eBPF** **p**rograms (VEP) based on an annotation-guided verification approach. The VEP toolchain comprises a C-level verifier, an annotation-aware compiler, and a bytecode-level proof checker. First, verification is conducted on the annotated C programs. To ensure they are free of undefined behavior (UB) per the C standard and only use limited resources. This phase also generates additional annotations and proof terms for later bytecode-level verification. Next, the verified C program is transformed into an annotated bytecode program by an annotation-aware compiler. In this step, the code, the annotations, and the proof terms are all converted to the bytecode level. Finally, a bytecode proof checker re-evaluates the proofs and the annotated bytecode to ensure compliance with eBPF standards, thereby completing the verification process. Our two-stage verification framework distributes substantial time and memory overhead to user space, while the kernel space contains only a proof checker with minimal time and space requirements.

In summary, we have developed a verification tool VEP for annotated eBPF programs, which offers the following advantages:

1. VEP achieves full programmability for eBPF programs, going beyond memory safety to verify the functional correctness of eBPF programs.
2. In user space, the verifier is highly automatic.
3. In kernel space, the proof checker is secure and efficient with lower time and memory consumption.
4. Our TCB is small, which includes only the proof checker in kernel space, excluding the C verifier and the compiler.

The structure of this paper is as follows: In Section 2, we describe the design of VEP, including the general framework and underlying design principles. In particular, we explain the design necessity of the two-stage verification scheme. In Section 3, 4 and 5, we introduce the detailed design of the three components of VEP respectively. In Section 6, we show our experiments and the performance of the proposed method. Section 7 and 8 introduce our future works and make a conclusion.

2 Overall Architecture of VEP

In this section, we will introduce the overall design of VEP. Additionally, we will discuss the design choices of the two-stage verification framework.

Tool	Full Programability	Automation	Small TCB	Low Time/Memory Cost
CBMC/Infer	-	+++	- - -	+++
VST	+	- -	+++	depend on implementation
VeriFast	+	+	- - -	+

Table 1: Comparison of different verification tools.

2.1 Two-stage Verification

To achieve full programmability, enabling users to write any safe and valid program, we have developed the verification tool VEP for annotated programs. Specifically, the VEP toolchain verifies whether an eBPF program (1) is free from aborting behaviors such as null-pointer dereferences and division by zero, and (2) only consumes a limited amount of resources.

VEP first utilizes a C-level verifier (referred to as VEP-C) to perform the initial checks on user-annotated C programs. Developers can repeatedly use VEP-C when developing their assertion-annotated source code: in a typical workflow, developers refine their code until VEP-C accepts it. At this stage, VEP-C employs symbolic execution to compute the strongest postcondition for each program statement, and uses an SMT solver to automatically derive assertions and generate corresponding proofs. Postconditions represent the conditions that must be satisfied after a program segment has been executed, and preconditions represent the conditions that are assumed to hold before execution begins. The process of symbolic execution can be understood as computing the strongest postcondition based on a given precondition.

```
/*@ 0 ⩽ x < 100 */
x = x + 1;
/*@ 0 ⩽ x ⩽ 100 */
```

In this example, the precondition is $P \triangleq 0 \leqslant x < 100$, and the postcondition to be checked is $Q \triangleq 0 \leqslant x \leqslant 100$. We need to verify whether, after executing $c \triangleq$`x=x+1` under the condition P, the postcondition Q holds. The first step is to compute the *strongest* postcondition; that is, the best we can tell about the program state after executing c given the initial condition P. In this case, the strongest postcondition is $\exists x_0, x = x_0 + 1 \wedge 0 \leqslant x_0 < 100$, where intuitively x_0 represents the value of x before the increment operation. During symbolic execution, such computation of strongest postconditions has its logic foundation in Hoare logic rules [30, 40]. The time complexity of the strongest postcondition computation is approximately linear with assertion length. So in general, the time complexity of symbolic execution is approximately linear with the product of the program length and the average assertion length.

Next, we use an SMT solver to determine whether $\exists x_0, x = x_0 + 1 \wedge 0 \leqslant x_0 < 100$ implies $0 \leqslant x \leqslant 100$. Although this example is simple, determining the validity of assertion derivations can be complex in practice. In fact, the decision problem is undecidable in general. Fortunately, existing research on SMT solvers has shown that modern solvers can produce correct results in many practical cases. VEP's built-in SMT solver is required not only to verify whether the derivations hold but also to provide (cvc5-style) proofs. Each proof consists of a list of proof steps. Every proof step derives a new conclusion from known propositions (including assumptions and conclusions proved earlier). Formally, a proof step contains one proof rule name, the associated parameters t_i, the premises φ_i, the resulting conclusion ψ, and its side condition C.

$$\text{RULENAME} : \frac{\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n \mid t_1, \ldots, t_m}{\psi} \text{ if } C$$

In the example of $(\exists x_0, x = x_0 + 1 \wedge 0 \leqslant x_0 < 100) \Rightarrow 0 \leqslant x \leqslant 100$, the SMT solver will produce a 'YES' with a 138-line proof. It means that the code has been successfully verified by VEP-C, with both the corresponding proof and strongest postcondition generated.

Computed strongest postconditions and SMT-generated proofs are inserted back into the original annotated program. The annotation-aware compiler (VEP-compiler) then compiles the elaborated C program into annotated eBPF bytecode. Unlike traditional compilers, relevant assertions and proofs will also undergo corresponding compilation passes.

Finally, VEP uses a bytecode-level proof checker (VEP-eBPF) to perform a final verification. VEP-eBPF similarly uses symbolic execution to compute the strongest postcondition for each statement and then checks the corresponding proofs to derive the assertions, but without requiring SMT solvers: it only checks the proofs based on basic logic rules, using a minimal proof checker. If the verification passes, the user-written program has successfully undergone VEP's verification process. In the end, the eBPF program will be loaded in the kernel and its execution is guaranteed to be safe. This

security assurance is achieved solely by verifying that the programs and the proofs checked by VEP-eBPF are consistent with one another. Therefore, the entire TCB of VEP is effectively reduced to the lightweight proof checker, VEP-eBPF.



Figure 1: The framework of VEP.

Figure 1 shows the whole workflow of VEP. Our two-stage verification addressed the three requirements mentioned in Section 1.

- Small and efficient to be a part of the kernel.
  For our two-stage verification process, this requirement is the easiest to fulfill. We leave VEP-C, which involves numerous SMT solver calls in user space, while keeping a simple proof checker VEP-eBPF in kernel space. VEP-eBPF performs only straightforward logical deductions without involving complex SMT operations, ensuring that the kernel space component remains simple and efficient.
- Final TCB is as minimal as possible.
  The safety of loading eBPF programs only relies on the correct implementation of VEP-eBPF. This reduces the risk associated with complex verification algorithms and enhances the overall reliability of the verification process.
- Highly automated and easy to use.
  Inevitably, our users need to learn how to write assertions to prove the safety of a program. Our approach incorporates lessons from tools such as VeriFast and VST, offering an annotation syntax that closely resembles C. This design choice reduces the learning curve, making it easier for users to write and understand assertions.

2.2 Discussion

In short, we believe an eBPF verifier should be powerful enough to reject unsafe programs and accept correct complex programs, and still be simple enough to be built in the kernel.

Why not use only the C verifier? In a single-phase C verification approach, users need to place a high level of trust in not only the C verifier but also the compiler. But even widely-used compilers such as GCC and LLVM continue to receive numerous bug reports daily. For instance, the LLVM bug tracker has numerous reports of bugs affecting various components of the compiler [24,46], such as the front end, the optimizer, and the code generator. These bug reports illustrate the necessity for users to trust the compiler while being aware of potential issues. Instead, we have a trustworthy bytecode verifier to ensure the final validation before loading, which will also be our only TCB.

Why not use only the bytecode verifier? Most importantly, if there is only one bytecode verifier, then it needs a strong SMT solver, which contradicts the simplicity goal of the whole verifier discussed above.

Second, the C verifier provides better computer-human interaction. An optimizing compiler may dramatically change the structure of a C program, making it impossible to convert verification results at the bytecode level back to the source level. If we only report failures at the bytecode level, users must understand how the whole toolchain works only to debug their code. Instead, the C verifier can directly generate C-level feedback, which is more understandable for developers.

A further reason is that writing an annotated bytecode program directly is challenging. Bytecode is very hard to comprehend, and thus it is even more difficult to write suitable assertions for it. Therefore, VEP provides a transformation from C assertions to bytecode assertions through an annotation-aware compiler, which enables users to write more readable assertions based on C code.

Unsafe C programs may be compiled to a safe bytecode program. Can such programs pass VEP? As the compiler is a black box for eBPF developers, we believe VEP should reject UB in C at the C verification level. For example, figure 2 shows an unsafe eBPF program. Due to the insufficient space (size of 20) in *buffer* to store the information of comm, the Linux verifier rejects the function. However, a C program (shown in figure 3) has out-of-bound array access. After being compiled into

```
1  int badhelpercall()
2  {
3      char buffer[1];
4      return bpf_get_current_comm(buffer, 20);
5  }
```

Figure 2: A program of bad helper call from PREVAIL benchmark.

```
1  int badhelpercall()
2  {
3      char buffer[1];
4      char buffer2[20];
5      return bpf_get_current_comm(buffer, 20);
6  }
```

Figure 3: Another program of bad helper call from PREVAIL benchmark.

bytecode, that access may be a valid albeit unintended location, say, *buffer2*. The C standard does not require *bufffer2* to be placed right after *buffer*. Compilers could choose to swap them for optimization. Advanced compilers may even detect this UB and aggressively exploit this fact by eliminating the whole C function. This program is accepted by version 5.10 of the Linux Kernel but is rejected by version 5.15. We believe that these programs need to be rejected as early as possible. VEP-C will reject all such programs at the C level.

How much additional efforts are needed for writing annotations? Typically, annotation-based verification tools require users to provide at least function specifications and loop invariants. For complex assertion derivations, users might also need to supply additional assertions to elaborate on the derivation steps. VEP offers some automation support for generating specifications and loop invariants, and we have found that, with this basic support, users can often complete program verification without *any* additional annotations. However, for complex programs, manual input is still required, particularly for verifying functional correctness.

If one manually modifies the generated annotated bytecode, is it possible to trick the VEP-eBPF checker and break the safety guarantee? Simply put: no. It is like you cannot modify the proof of $0 = 0$ to prove $0 = 1$.

In scenarios where a user modifies the annotated bytecode and/or its corresponding proofs, VEP-eBPF still meticulously verifies the alignment between them. If the modifications result in a correct match, meaning that the proof still validates the safety and correctness of the altered bytecode, VEP-eBPF will permit the bytecode to be loaded into the kernel. This ensures that even after modifications, as long as the integrity of the proofs is maintained, the program remains secure and is considered safe for kernel execution.

Conversely, if a user alters the annotated bytecode and introduces incorrect or inconsistent proofs, VEP-eBPF will detect these discrepancies during the verification process. The proof checker is designed to ensure that only bytecode with valid, accurate proofs can be executed within the kernel. When erroneous proofs are encountered—those that fail to substantiate the safety or correctness of the bytecode—VEP-eBPF will reject the bytecode, preventing its being loaded into the kernel.

How can we make sure that the pre/postconditions correctly describe the property that we cares? Regarding whether the modified code functions as the user intends, additional proofs related to functional correctness can be provided by the user to ensure this aspect. VEP-eBPF's primary focus is to guarantee that any code it approves is safe to execute. However, the tool will not automatically verify that the modified code behaves as desired; it will only ensure that the code can be safely run without introducing security vulnerabilities. Therefore, it is up to the user to include further assertions and proofs to confirm that the program's functionality aligns with their expectations.

2.3 Related Work

To the best of our knowledge, VEP is the first annotation-guided eBPF verification toolchain. In theory, for any correct eBPF program written by programmers, There exists a way to add annotations such that VEP can verify its correctness.

Most existing eBPF verifiers, including the Linux verifier [8], PREVAIL [28], etc., are automatic verifiers. Admittedly, automatic verifiers are easy to use. But in theory, checking whether an eBPF program can be safely executed and terminated is an undecidable problem. Indeed, both the Linux verifier and PREVAIL encounter problems when handling loops with complex data structures and may generate false positive results for certain eBPF programs, which limits eBPF programs from achieving full programmability.

We have identified ExoBPF [11] and Serval [37], which necessitate users to add specifications at the bytecode level. These tools conduct symbolic execution uti-

lizing theorem provers and subsequently employ an SMT solver to resolve constraints. Specifically, ExoBPF utilizes Lean, while Serval leverages Rosette. Although these tools are indeed powerful, they require users to be familiar with eBPF bytecode and theorem provers to effectively write bytecode specifications.

Previous tools for annotation-based verification have provided notable evaluations; however, they are not fully appropriate for being an eBPF verifier. Vale [17], utilizing Dafny, performs the verification of assembly language cryptographic code that has been annotated for enhanced clarity. Dafny is based on the Z3 SMT solver, which is a comprehensive and powerful solver. Ironclad Apps [29] has modified this foundation, selecting only the essential aspects of Z3's solving features to suit operating system verification. These extensive verification tools have proved to be effective in the verification of assembly code in certain situations. Yet, for eBPF developers, understanding and annotating at the assembly level requires a significant investment in learning. It is our objective to enable developers to annotate directly at the C level, thus creating an end-to-end verification process from C to bytecode. The pivotal element of this process will be an efficient verifier, designed to be sufficiently streamlined for integration directly into the kernel.

```
1  void memset(char *p1, __u32 n, char v)
2  /*@ With l1
3      Require chars(p1,n,l1)
4      Ensure ∃ l2, chars(p1,n,l2)
5  */
6  {
7   __u32 i = 0;
8   /*@ i == 0 && chars(p1,n,l1) */
9   /*@ Inv: ∃ l2, 0 ⩽ i ⩽ n && chars(p1,n,l2) */
10  for (; i < n; ) {
11  /*@ ∃ l2, 0 ⩽ i < n && chars(p1,n,l2) */
12
13  p1[i] = v;
14
15  /*@ ∃ l3 l2, 0 ⩽ i < n &&
16        l3[0:i] == l2[0:i] &&
17        l3[i] == v &&
18        l3[i+1:n] == l2[i+1:n] &&
19        chars(p1,n,l3) */
20
21  i++;
22
23  /*@ ∃ l3 l2, 0 ⩽ i - 1 < n &&
24        l3[0:i-1] == l2[0:i-1] &&
25        l3[i-1] == v &&
26        l3[i:n] == l2[i:n] &&
27        chars(p1,n,l3) */
28  }
29  /*@ ∃ l2, i == n && chars(p1,n,l2) */
30  return ;
31 }
```

Figure 4: Annotated memset.

3 Detailed Design of VEP-C

VEP-C is an annotation-based verifier for annotated C programs, implemented based on traditional ***symbolic execution*** algorithm with an ***entailment solver*** to check the validity of the verification conditions. It uses separation logic assertions to represent program states and performs symbolic execution. The entailment solver is based on a separation logic elimination solver and an SMT solver. During the verification process, it generates proofs for assertion derivations. In this section, we will detail the design of VEP-C, focusing on the assertion syntax, the symbolic execution process, and the verified program.

3.1 Verification Process of VEP-C

Throughout this subsection, we use the annotated program *memset* in Figure 4 as an example[2]. In this example, we intentionally write "`i = 0; for (; i < n;) { ...; i ++ }`" (respectively in line 7, 10, and 21) rather than the commonly used "`for (i = 0; i < n; ++ i) { ... }`" to illustrate the verification steps more conveniently. This is not a requirement or restriction in realistic verification tools.

Line 2-5: In the beginning, the user needs to provide a function specification, which indicates the condition that the arguments together with the initial program state need to satisfy when entering the function and the condition that needs to be satisfied when exiting the function. A function specification consists of a **With** clause, a **Require** clause, and an **Ensure** clause. The **Require** clause indicates the function precondition; the **Ensure** clause indicates the function postcondition; and the **With** clause indicates the list of logical variables mentioned in precondition which will be used in the whole program assertions. In this example, the precondition is `chars(p1, n,l1)` (line 3), which indicates that `p1` is an array of length `n`, with its data `l1` being a list of characters. The postcondition provided in line 4 specifies that the array stored at `p1` will be modified to a new character list `l2`.

Line 7-8: To verify the program in Figure 4, VEP-C initiates symbolic execution based on the preconditions of the function. For instance, after processing the variable declaration and initialization at line 7, the strongest

[2]To facilitate the reader's understanding, we present a version of the annotated program that leans more towards functional correctness. Assertions in actual code are more straightforward.

postcondition in line 8 is computed. In this example, assertions generated through symbolic execution are highlighted in red, distinguishing themselves from the assertions provided by the user, which are displayed in blue.

Line 9-29: Before entering the loop, the user needs to provide a loop invariant, which indicates the property that the program state needs to satisfy at the beginning and end of each loop iteration. VEP-C will check whether the assertion before entering the function (lines 8) implies the loop invariant (line 9). If the above check passes, VEP-C will continue to symbolically execute the loop condition testing from the loop invariant. Thus, in its strongest postcondition (line 11), an additional proposition $i < n$ is added, comparing to the **`Inv`**. Moreover, symbolic execution will generate the strongest postcondition of the assignment statement (lines 15-19), and the strongest postcondition of the incremental step (lines 23-27). VEP-C will check whether the assertion entails the loop invariant **`Inv`**. The check is successful, thereby proving the correctness of the loop invariant. Subsequently, we can derive the strongest postcondition at the end of the loop, which is the strongest postcondition of **`Inv`** when the loop condition evaluates to false (line 29).

Line 30: Finally, we perform symbolic execution on the return statement. Unlike other statements, the return statement requires the calculation of the return value (although there is no return value in this example), followed by the deallocation of all declared local variables and corresponding updates of the assertions. In this case, the variable `i` is deallocated, and the assertion is updated accordingly into `∃ l2, chars(p1,n,l2)`. The final step is to check whether the updated assertion implies the postcondition of the function. The proof here is straightforward, thus completing the verification of this example.

3.2 Assertion Language of VEP-C

In the example of Figure 4, we used first-order logic to describe program states. For some C programs, such assertions are sufficient to capture time costs and the changes made to memory. However, most programs manipulate more than one data structure (array, linked list, tree, etc). These data structures are stored in disjoint memory locations and such disjointness is critical in verification. For example, the C standard says that *strncpy* copies strings from source to destination, while the source and destination memory space are disjoint [32, Section 7.24.2.4]. Therefore, some naive specification like the one in Figure 5 does not correctly describes strncpy's behavior.

This specification appears to be very concise, but it overlooks a critical issue: whether the two arrays, `p1` and

```
1  void strncpy (char *p1, char *p2, __u32 n)
2  /*@ With l1 l2
3      Require chars(p1,n,l1) && chars(p2,n,l2)
4      Ensure chars(p1,n,l2) && chars(p2,n,l2)
5  */;
```

Figure 5: A naive strncpy specification.

`p2`, overlap. If there is an overlap, the behavior of the program could differ significantly, leading to potential unintended side effects that are not accounted for by this simple specification. Therefore, merely using first-order logic is insufficient to meet our needs.

State-of-the-art research has provided us with new insights, particularly through the introduction of separation logic into assertions. Tools such as VST, VeriFast, and Hip/Sleek [38] have demonstrated that using separation logic is an effective method for clearly describing properties and facilitating symbolic execution, especially in proofs related to memory properties.

Separation logic [41] uses a new connective *separating conjunction* to ensure that different names duplicate no identical addresses. The separating conjunction $P * Q$ represents the existence of two disjoint portions of the state, one that satisfies P and one that satisfies Q. Specifically,

$$m \models P * Q \Leftrightarrow \exists m_1, m_2.\, m = m_1 \uplus m_2 \wedge m_1 \models P \wedge m_2 \models Q.$$

Here $\uplus$ means the disjoint union[3] and $m \models P$ means m satisfies P. A distinction between $*$ and boolean conjunction && is that $P * P \neq P$ where $P \&\& P = P$. In particular, if $\mathbf{store}(p, v)$ means that the value v is stored at address p, $\mathbf{store}(p, v) * \mathbf{store}(q, u)$ implies $p \neq q$, and thus $\mathbf{store}(p, v) * \mathbf{store}(p, v)$ is always false: there is no way to divide a heap that a cell p goes to both partitions.

VEP-C uses separation-logic assertions in the canonical form of a symbolic heap. A symbolic heap is in the form $\exists \overrightarrow{x}.(P_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge P_n \wedge Q_1 * \cdots * Q_m)$, where the pure part P describes memory-irrelevant properties between terms (e.g. `e1`, `e2`), and the spatial part Q is a separating conjunction of spatial predicates. For example, `e1==e2` and `e1>e2` can appear as memory-irrelevant conjuncts; the empty heap predicate `emp` and the points-to predicate `store(e1,e2)` can appear as spatial conjuncts. Additionally, users can define their own predicates according to their specific needs. For example, a user can define a string array predicate such as `chars(a,e1,e2)`.

With the help of separation logic, we can write the specification shown in Figure 6, which describes the sce-

[3] $A \uplus B = A \cup B$ if $A \cap B = \varnothing$, Otherwise, $A \uplus B$ is undefined. For example, $\{1,2,3,5\} = \{1,3\} \uplus \{2,5\}$, but $\{1,3\} \uplus \{1,2\}$ is undefined.

nario stipulated by the C standard where p1 and p2 do not overlap in memory.

```
void strncpy (char *p1, char *p2, __u32 n)
/*@ With l1 l2
    Require chars(p1,n,l1) * chars(p2,n,l2)
    Ensure ∃ l3,
           chars(p1,n,l3) * chars(p2,n,l2)
*/;
```

Figure 6: A correct strncpy specification.

Traditionally, these terms (e1, e2, etc) above in pure parts and spatial parts should be memory-irrelevant expressions. For example, if x is a C variable of a struct type, then &(x.tail) is a memory-irrelevant expression, because computing its value does not include a load from memory. Many verification tools use this setting internally because this assertion language prevents a lot of ambiguity. For example, it may be unclear whether the predicate store(*x, 0) only claims the memory permission at address *x, or it claims the memory permission at addresses *x and x – if we take the address of storing variable x into consideration, it becomes even more complicated. VEP-C extends traditional symbolic heap and allows users to use memory-related expressions, which makes assertions more concise. VEP-C automatically transforms the expression to the traditional symbolic heap. In this way, users avoid a large portion of boilerplate[4]. For example, VEP-C allows users to write *y==x→tail, which is equivalent to:

```
∃ v yp,
store((field_addr(x,tail),v) *
store(y, yp) * store(yp, v)
```

3.3 Output of VEP-C

After the symbolic execution and entailment solver processes, VEP-C completes the verification of the input program. Based on the verification process, VEP-C generates a verified C program, which is then passed to the VEP-compiler to be compiled into bytecode. Figure 7 illustrates the verified C program corresponding to the program in Figure 4. Due to space constraints, we have omitted the specific assertions and proof content.

In this example, Proof_1, Proof_3, Proof_4, Proof_5, and Proof_7 pertain to the verification of various safety checks during symbolic execution. These include range checks for array writes, as well as checks

[4]The detailed syntax and transformation algorithm can be found in Appendix A and B.

```
void memset(char *p1, __u32 n, char v)
/*@ With l1
    Require chars(p1,n,l1)
    Ensure chars(p1,n,repeat(v,n))
*/
{
 __u32 i = 0;
 /*@ Assertion_1 with Proof_1*/
 /*@ Inv with Proof_2 and Proof_6*/
 for (; i < n; ) {
 /*@ Assertion_2 with Proof_3*/
 p1[i] = v;
 /*@ Assertion_3 with Proof_4*/
 i++;
 /*@ Assertion_4 with Proof_5*/
 }
 /*@ Assertion_5 with Proof_7*/
 return ; /*@ Proof_8*/
}
```

Figure 7: Verified memset.

to ensure that there are no undefined behaviors during assignments. Proof_2 and Proof_6 are associated with the verification of the validity of loop invariants. Proof_8 ensures that the function postcondition is satisfied upon completion of the function.

4 Detailed Design of VEP-compiler

An annotated C program undergoes several compilation passes before being converted into an annotated eBPF bytecode. While most of these passes are standard, modifications to assertions and proofs are necessary throughout the process. It's worth noting that the VEP-compiler contains only a few optimization passes at present, primarily for simplicity, which may not generate the most efficient bytecode. How to incorporate additional compilation optimizations while ensuring accurate transformation of assertions and proofs is a future work.

Figure 8 shows the whole compilation process. Every pass has a single simple and clear purpose, as in the nanopass framework [43]. We discuss the transformation during relevant passes in the rest of this section.

4.1 IR Generation

In our intermediate representation, we replace structure-member access by dereferencing the address of the structure plus the offset of the member. We do the same for assertions, as illustrated by the following example.



Figure 8: The nanopass-style compilation process

```
//@ ∃ v, store((field_addr(x,tail),v)
                ⇓
//@ ∃ v, store(x + 8,v)
```

4.2 Calling Conventions

The BPF calling convention is defined as follows.

1. `R0` stores the return value.
2. `R1` to `R5` are used to pass arguments.
3. `R6` to `R9` are callee saved. Others are caller-saved.

All the helper functions obey the suggested calling convention. We adopt the same convention in compiling in-program functions, so the compiler modifies function specifications to reflect the calling convention as follows.

1. Return value `__return` is replaced by `R0`.
2. Function parameters are replaced by `R1` to `R5`.
3. State that `R6` to `R9` are preserved.

The generated code saves used callee-saved registers on the stack at the beginning of a procedure and restores them before returning. To convince the symbolic executor that callee-saved registers are indeed unchanged, we also modify each assertion in the procedure. They state that certain portions of the stack contain the original values of callee-saved registers.

Figure 9 shows the specification in Figure 5 produced by this pass. Besides the substitution defined previously, the compiler introduces auxiliary logic variables `_Ri`-s to relate the register values at function entry and those at the return point.

4.3 Register Allocation

We adopt a standard "iterated register coalescing" algorithm [27]. Most of the time, simply substituting variables

```
strncpy:
/*@ With l1 l2 _R1 _R2 _R3 _R6 _R7 _R8 _R9
    Require
      _R1 == R1 &&
      _R2 == R2 &&
      _R3 == R3 &&
      _R6 == R6 &&
      _R7 == R7 &&
      _R8 == R8 &&
      _R9 == R9 &&
      chars(R1, R3, l1) * chars(R2, R3, l2)
    Ensure
      _R6 == R6 &&
      _R7 == R7 &&
      _R8 == R8 &&
      _R9 == R9 &&
      chars(_R1,_R3,l2) * chars(_R2,_R3,l2)
*/
```

Figure 9: Transformation of the function specification for strncpy. `p1`, `p2`, `n` and `__return` are replaced by `R1`, `R2`, `R3`, and `R0`, respectively.

in assertions with their corresponding registers (or their location on the stack, if it is spilled) is enough. The only exception is when the variable is not live (the value of the variable is not used later) at that point. In that case, the register does not necessarily hold the value of the variable: maybe another variable is using it. To make the assertion valid while retaining information, the variable should be substituted by an existentially quantified logic variable. Figure 10 shows a complete example. The third line in the source code takes the address of `x`, so `x` is spilled to the stack. `p` and `q` are assigned to the same register `R1` because they are unused.

In annotated code, register allocation can sometimes yield interesting results. Here is one such example.

```
int x = 0;          R0 = 0
//@ x == 1    ⇒     //@ ∃ _x, _x == 1
return;             ret
```

In the previous example, the C code clearly fails VEP-C verification, but the compiler generates valid eBPF bytecode for it. This is due to liveness analysis determining that the value of x is not live at that point. We believe rejecting such code at the VEP-C level is reasonable and does not compromise programmability. Even if one only

```
int x, y, *p, *q;
x = 0; y = 1;
p = &x; q = 0;
//@ y == x + 1 && p != q
return y;
```

⇓

```
*(R10 - 4) = 0
R0 = 1
R1 = R10
R1 -= 4
R1 = 0 // p and q are not used
/*@ R1 == *(R10-4) + 1 &&
    ∃ _p _q, _p != _q */
ret
```

Figure 10: An assertion after register allocation.

uses VEP-compiler and VEP-eBPF, he/she can still trust the safety of the C code, because (1) the precondition is unchanged, and (2) propositions related to resources (time, memory) are unaffected.

4.4 Frame Layout

In annotated C programs, a variable is available after we declare it. But in bytecode, there are no such declarations. So the frame—which contains spilled scalar variables, structures, and so on—should be specified in the precondition so that the symbolic executor knows which addresses are valid. Knowing how much stack space a procedure consumes is also necessary to verify that the whole program does not exceed the stack space limit.

Figure 11 shows a complete example. In the example, we assume the compiler places `l` at `R10-16`. Consequently, `R10-16` stores an integer, and `R10-8` stores a pointer to a **`struct`** `list`. The underscores indicate that their actual values are not needed.

5 Detailed Design of VEP-eBPF and Proof Check

VEP-eBPF processes the annotated bytecode produced by the VEP-compiler and performs symbolic execution. During this execution, when it encounters assertion entailment or safety checks typically requiring an entailment solver, VEP-eBPF distinguishes itself from VEP-C by not invoking an SMT solver. Instead, it verifies whether

```
struct list {
  int x;
  struct list *next;
};
int f()
/*@ Require emp
   Ensure __return == 0 */
{
  struct list l;
  l.head = 0;
  return l.head;
}
```

⇓

```
f:
/*@ Require
      *(R10-16) == _ *
      *(R10-8)  == _
   Ensure R0 == 0 */
...
```

Figure 11: A precondition decorated with frame information. Assume `l` is located at `R10-16`, then the compiler guarantees that `R10-16` stores an integer and `R10-8` stores a pointer to a **`struct`** `list`. The underscores indicate that they are uninitialized.

the proofs, generated by the SMT solver and transformed by the VEP-compiler, correctly establish the required entailments. If all entailments can be validated through their corresponding proofs, it indicates that the bytecode is safe, allowing the program to be loaded into the kernel.

VEP-eBPF's proof language is designed to include both spatial parts derivation proofs and pure propositional parts derivation proofs. The spatial parts proofs are primarily syntactic transformations of the entailment using established separation logic properties. These properties have been formalized and proved within the Coq proof assistant, ensuring their correctness. On the other hand, the pure parts proofs are based on a proof language inspired by cvc5, a well-known SMT solver. In this process, no SMT solving is required. The spatial syntax transformation and pure proof checking are handled by highly efficient algorithms.

As a result, VEP-eBPF is an efficient, low-memory proof checker ideally suited for kernel-space deployment. The lightweight nature of these algorithms contributes to the overall performance, making VEP-eBPF a robust tool for verifying the safety of eBPF bytecode without

the overhead of traditional SMT-based methods.

6 Evaluation

In this section, we evaluate the time cost and memory usage of VEP and compare its performance with the Linux verifier and PREVAIL. Our benchmark primarily includes four categories of programs: the Linux samples, the Prevail samples, C standard library string functions, and a selection of unsafe programs. Table 2 and Table 3 present the results of the Linux verifier, PREVAIL, and VEP on our benchmark. The selected programs encompass common data structure types frequently utilized in eBPF applications. Detailed results for each program can be found in Appendix C, in Table 4 and Table 5.

We used Linux Kernel version 5.15 and the PREVAIL version updated on August 25, 2024. All data can be accessed via our GitHub repository[5].

6.1 Performance

From the perspective of time and memory usage, the Linux verifier exhibits significantly greater stability, showcasing excellent average performance in both metrics across the majority of programs. In contrast, the performance of both PREVAIL and VEP-C is approximately comparable, with both displaying instability in certain instances. While VEP-eBPF's time overhead has yet to match that of the Linux verifier, it has demonstrated a notable performance improvement of 3 to 5 times compared to VEP-C and PREVAIL. Furthermore, VEP-eBPF's memory usage typically falls within the range of 2,000 to 3,000 KB for most programs, which is approximately one-fourth of the memory consumption observed in VEP-C. These enhancements in both time and memory efficiency clearly underscore the advantages of our framework.

6.2 Compatibility

From the perspective of verification results, both the Linux verifier and PREVAIL can reject the unsafe programs correctly. However, they exhibit relatively high false positive rates, i.e., many safe programs are rejected. This can be attributed in part to their limitations on handling loops (e.g., programs in Stringlib) and, in part, to bugs in the verifiers themselves or instability in the SMT solver (e.g., programs in Linux-samples and PREVAIL-samples yielding different results across different versions of the Linux verifier and PREVAIL). VEP, on the other hand, adopts a highly conservative approach by requiring the SMT solver to generate proofs and employs a lightweight proof checker to fundamentally eliminate false negatives. As long as the user provides correct annotations, VEP also ensures there are no false positives.

[5]https://anonymous.4open.science/r/NSDI25-VEP-535-81EC/

6.3 Manually Written Assertions

Tables 2 and 3 present a comparison of the total lines of code alongside the number of assertion lines added. This demonstrates that our tool can effectively validate programs without requiring an extensive number of assertions. Moreover, we have successfully generated specifications for several functions through simple methods. As our tool continues to evolve, we anticipate the ability to generate even more assertions automatically, thereby further reducing the burden on users.

6.4 Case Study : Key_Connection

In the last row of Table 2 and 3, we also included an additional example of a non-eBPF program. This example features a function from a Layer 7 (L7) filter, which is designed to determine the appropriate server to connect to based on a string key. Detailed code and the annotations for this example can be found in Appendix D. For this program, VEP generates 350 lines of annotated bytecode and 5,800 lines of proof. This example demonstrates that our tool is genuinely aimed at achieving full programmability.

Having full programmability could greatly expand the applicability and potential of eBPF. For example, traditional sidecars may cause security and performance issues for service mesh users, and thus Cilium [20] proposed to implement sidecar functionalities in eBPF. However, due to the inability to support flexible L7 processing in eBPF, Cilium encounters difficulty in meeting customers' demands and thus has to decouple the complex L7 functions from the sidecar to an additional proxy [23]. With VEP, such a proxy can be removed, which may simplify the design of the eBPF-based sidecar.

7 Future Work

In advancing eBPF program verification, several critical areas offer promising research opportunities. This section outlines key directions for future work designed to enhance and expand the capabilities of our verification framework, aiming to make it more robust and applicable to real-world scenarios.

Programs	Total Code Lines	Linux verifier				PREVAIL			
		PR	MaxT (ms)	AvgT (ms)	MaxM (KB)	PR	MaxT (ms)	AvgT (ms)	MaxM (KB)
Linux samples	618	9/10	1.13	0.94	4196	10/10	48.37	12.48	7918
PREVAIL samples	252	6/10	1.08	0.71	4200	8/10	74.67	13.88	5279
StringLib	321	3/10	2.69	1.83	5168	1/10	39.89	39.89	7267
Unsafe Programs	195	10/10	-	-	-	10/10	-	-	-
Key_Connection	63	0/1	-	-	-	0/1	-	-	-

Table 2: Evaluation results for Linux verifier and PREVAIL.

Programs	Total Asrt Lines	VEP-C				compiler	VEP-eBPF		
		PR	MaxT (ms)	AvgT (ms)	MaxM (KB)	AvgT (ms)	MaxT (ms)	AvgT (ms)	MaxM (KB)
Linux samples	76	10/10	158.12	39.46	32569	1.73	21.69	8.42	8034
PREVAIL samples	49	10/10	40.23	9.38	12422	0.47	4.40	2.76	3047
StringLib	112	10/10	36.60	13.47	12612	0.66	3.54	2.63	2970
Unsafe Programs	32	10/10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Key_Connection	17	1/1	16.24	16.24	8534	0.56	2.48	2.48	2440

Table 3: Evaluation results for VEP.

Towards Functional Correctness As our demands for programs increase, memory safety alone no longer meets our development requirements. We aim to go further by supporting the verification of the functional correctness of eBPF programs. From this perspective, VEP needs to enable users to directly write proofs within C annotations or provide an interface to incorporate external proofs.

Towards Less Annotations Given that VEP currently requires users to provide necessary C annotations, including function preconditions, postconditions, and loop invariants, we aim to introduce additional tools to automate the generation of these annotations and reduce the user's burden. Traditional verification tools [22, 34] have already made progress in this area, and recent advancements have been achieved by integrating large language models [42, 44]. In the future, VEP will be able to adopt similar approaches to automate the generation of some annotations, thereby minimizing the user's workload.

Towards Compilation Optimization Advanced optimization passes may dramatically change the control flow and data flow of a program, and assertion annotations should be modified accordingly. In our current compiler, one such compilation pass is register allocation, in which multiple variables may be represented by one register (as long as their lifetime does not overlap) — we translate all these variables to the register in assertions. In the future, optimization passes may be added to eliminate some redundant instructions or redundant variables. Then, corresponding algorithms need to be designed to compile assertion annotations.

8 Conclusion

Since its proposal, eBPF is widely used in various domains while its verification often comes with a trade-off between safety and programmability. In this paper, we propose a two-stage automatic formal framework that addresses this issue between verification and programmability. It empowers eBPF developers to write annotations regarding the memory to guide automatic verification. As far as we are concerned, this is the first approach that could verify the safety and resource constraints of eBPF programs without compromising programmability. Specifically, a safe eBPF program can always pass VEP's check, provided that it includes sufficient annotations.

Based on this, we implement a prototype toolchain VEP. Our evaluation further demonstrates that VEP can verify the safety of complex programs with moderate overhead, which highlights the potential of the two-stage framework as a practical solution for kernel security. We believe this will enable eBPF to support more flexible and powerful programs across a wider range of domains.

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A Syntax of VEP-C Assertions

In this section, we discuss the syntax of VEP-C assertions, which are divided into two main categories: user assertions and internal assertions. User assertions enable developers to annotate C code with specific directives, whereas internal assertions support the tool's symbolic execution and reasoning processes.

A.1 Syntax of User Assertions

The primary design principle of user assertions is to align as closely as possible with the habits of C programmers, while also ensuring sufficient expressiveness for formal reasoning at the logical level. We begin by defining the expressions used in user assertions, followed by an explanation of how to construct a complete assertion. Lastly, we will discuss the structure of function specifications within this framework.

The expressions are inductively defined in Figure 12. The only thing unfamiliar is custom functions. They are functions in the *logic* world. For example, we provide a built-in function `rev`(l) that reverses a list (a list of values, not a data structure in C).

A user assertion can consist of several branches, each of which is divided into a section that describes pure facts and another that describes memory aspects. The syntax tree is defined in Figure 13. The semantics of user assertions is a little different from textbook separation logics, because of its HCI nature. To convince yourself that our transformation explained later makes sense, imagine we normalize every memory-related expression to a form $\star l$. We assume two ls are different simply by their syntax. Then, each proposition—whether pure or spatial—describes such memory locations in addition to their spatial part, if any. When they are connected through conjunction `&&` or separating conjunction `*`, we union these locations; when connected through `||`, we keep them local to each case.

Just like custom functions, users can introduce custom predicates. For example, our built-in predicate `Ebpf_map`(m) denotes that an eBPF map is stored at a location m.

A function specification consists of three parts: logical variable list (**With** clause), precondition (**Require** clause), and postcondition (**Ensure** clause).

With clause. An implicit "$\forall$" around the specification. They are sometimes essential to relate the program state at the function exit point to the one at the function entry. They can even appear in annotations inside the function

Expression	e	::=	$z \in \mathbb{Z}_{64}$	integer literal
		|	v_p | v_l	C variable, logic variable
		|	`&`e | `*`e	address, dereference
		|	$\odot e$ | $e_1 \oplus e_2$	unary and binary operation
		|	e_1`[`e_2`]`	array indexing
		|	e`.`m | e`->`m	member access
		|	`sizeof(`t`)`	type size
		|	$f(e_1, \ldots, e_n)$	custom function
Unary operator	$\odot$	::=	`!` | `~` | `-` | `+` | ...	
Binary operator	$\oplus$	::=	`+` | `-` | `*` | `/` | ...	

Figure 12: Syntax of expressions.

Pure proposition	P	::=	$e_1 \oplus e_2$	comparison
		|	P_1 `&&` P_2	conjunction
		|	P_1 `||` P_2	disjunction
		|	P_1 `->` P_2	implication
		|	`!`P	negation
		|	`exists` x,P	existential quantification
		|	`forall` x,P	universal quantification
		|	$p(e_1, \ldots, e_n)$	custom predicate
Spatial proposition, assertion	S	::=	P	
		|	P `&&` S	conjunction
		|	S_1 `*` S_2	separating conjunction
		|	S_1 `||` S_2	disjunction
		|	`exists` x,S	existential quantification
		|	$p(e_1, \ldots, e_n)$	custom predicate
Comparison operator	$\oplus$	::=	`>` | `>=` | `<` | `<=` | `=` | `!=`	

Figure 13: Syntax of user assertions.

so that developers have convenient access to the initial state. In general, their values should be "determinable" from the precondition.

Require clause. The precondition describes properties that the program state at function entry should satisfy.

Ensure clause. The postcondition describes properties that the program states when the function exits should satisfy. We use the keyword `__return` to refer to the return value, if any.

The syntax of function specifications is formally defined in Figure 14:

A.2 Syntax of Internal Assertions

We use a canonical form of assertions, internal assertions, actual symbolic execution, constraint solving, and everything. They have a simpler structure and clearer semantics (paradoxically, user-friendly assertions have *complex* semantics). Each internal assertion consists of several branches; each of which includes four parts: **Exist**, **Local**, **Prop**, and **Sep**. **Exist** is a list of existential variables, either explicitly written by developers or automatically generated during transformation (explained later). **Local** describes the relations between program variables and the logic world. For example, in C, `&`$v = e$ means that the address of the program variable v is expression e; in eBPF bytecode, $r = e$ means the register r stores value e. **Prop** stores pure facts. **Sep** stores memory-related facts. The syntax of internal assertions is defined in Figure 15.

We will use an example to clearly illustrate the distinction between user assertions and internal assertions. Consider the following annotation in a C program:

```
exists v, y = &x && x == 2 * v &&
          forall n, v != n * n
```

An equivalent internal assertion looks like this:

```
Ex    : v vx vy
Local : &x = px,  &y = py
Prop  : vy == px && vx == 2 * v &&
        forall n, n != n * n
Sep   : store(px, int, vx)
      * store(py, int, vy)
```

In this example, the user assertion describes an integer variable x, whose value is an even number that is not a perfect square; y is a pointer to x. The internal assertion introduces two new existential variables vx and vy to

Function specification	F	::=	$(\forall v_1,\ldots,v_n.S_{pre},S_{post})$

Figure 14: Syntax of function specification.

Assertion	A	::=	H	singleton
		$\mid$	$A \vee H$	disjunction
Heap	H	::=	$\exists x_1,\ldots,x_n.L \wedge P \star S$	
Local	L	::=	$\bullet$	empty
		$\mid$	$\&v = e, L$	address
Pure proposition	P	::=	$e_1 \oplus e_2$	comparison
		$\mid$	$\neg P \mid P_1 \wedge P_2 \mid P_1 \vee P_2 \mid P_1 \rightarrow P_2$	connective
		$\mid$	$\exists x.P \mid \forall x.P$	quantification
		$\mid$	$p(e_1,\ldots,e_n)$	custom predicate
Spatial proposition	S	::=	$\bullet$	empty heap
		$\mid$	$S_1 \star S_2$	separating conjunction
		$\mid$	$e_1 \mapsto e_2$ type t	store
		$\mid$	$e_1 \mapsto -$ type t	uninitialized store
		$\mid$	$p(e_1,\ldots,e_n)$	custom predicate
Expression	e	::=	$z \in \mathbb{Z}$	integer constant
		$\mid$	x	logic variable
		$\mid$	$\odot e \mid e_1 \oplus e_2$	arithmetic
		$\mid$	$\&e_1 \rightarrow m$	member offset
		$\mid$	$f(e_1,\ldots,e_n)$	custom function

Figure 15: (Abstract) Syntax of C internal assertions.

Normal form	N	::=	$\overrightarrow{H}$
Heap	G,H	::=	$\exists \overrightarrow{x}.P \,\&\&\, \overrightarrow{B}$
Body	B	::=	$p(e_1,\ldots,)$

Figure 16: Syntax of DNF.

represent the current values of the program variables x and y, respectively. It is more structured and facilitates symbolic execution more conveniently.

B Transformation To Internal Assertion

In this section, we show how user assertions are transformed into internal assertions.

B.1 Step 1: Normalization

This phase puts an assertion in a sort of disjunctive normal form (DNF). Such a normal form is defined in Figure 16. The normalization procedure is described in Figure 17.

B.2 Step 2: Convert Expressions

In this phase, we convert expressions in user assertions to expressions in internal assertions, at the same time generating auxiliary **Local** and **Sep**. The procedure is defined in Figure 18. The judgement $\mathcal{V}(e,L,S,x) = (e',L',S',x')$ means that under context L,S,x, the value of e is e' and the context is updated to L',S',x'. $\mathcal{A}$ is similar, computing addresses (if valid) instead of values. The conversion is naturally extended to pure propositions $\mathcal{T}(P)$ and spatial propositions $\mathcal{T}(B)$, replacing each expression e in them with $\mathcal{V}(e)$, which we omit here.

B.3 Step 3: Sanity Check

Our pure propositions P can contain spatial expressions, so they are not really pure. Consequently, some user assertions cannot be transformed into internal ones. For example, the following user assertion is invalid.

$$\texttt{forall}\ i,\ 0 <= i\ \&\&\ i < 4 => a[i] == 0$$

A simple scope checking on internal assertions is enough to exclude such invalid cases. That is, every logic variable appearing in S should be bound by existential variables introduced in `exists` x,S.

C Full Evaulations

Full test results of previous work and VEP are shown in Table 4 and Table 5, respectively.

D Case Study : Key_connection

Figure 19 presents the complete Key_connection program, though only the assertions used to verify

$$norm(P) = P \qquad norm(p(e_1,\ldots,e_n)) = p(e_1,\ldots,e_n) \qquad \frac{norm(S) = \exists\overrightarrow{x_1}.P_1 \,\&\&\, \overrightarrow{B_1},\ldots,\exists\overrightarrow{x_n}.P_n \,\&\&\, \overrightarrow{B_n}}{norm(\exists x,S) = \exists\overrightarrow{x,x_1}.P_1 \,\&\&\, \overrightarrow{B_1},\ldots,\exists\overrightarrow{x,x_n}.P_n \,\&\&\, \overrightarrow{B_n}}$$

$$\frac{norm(S) = \exists\overrightarrow{x_1}.P_1 \,\&\&\, \overrightarrow{B_1},\ldots,\exists\overrightarrow{x_n}.P_n \,\&\&\, \overrightarrow{B_n}}{norm(P \;\&\&\; S) = \exists\overrightarrow{x_1}.(P \,\&\&\, P_1) \,\&\&\, \overrightarrow{B_1},\ldots,\exists\overrightarrow{x_n}.(P \,\&\&\, P_n) \,\&\&\, \overrightarrow{B_n}} \qquad \frac{norm(S_1) = \overrightarrow{H_1} \qquad norm(S_2) = \overrightarrow{H_2}}{norm(S_1 \;||\; S_2) = \overrightarrow{H_1 H_2}}$$

$$\frac{norm(S_1) = H_1,\ldots,H_n \qquad norm(S_2) = G_1,\ldots,G_m}{norm(S_1 \;*\; S_2) = merge(H_1,G_1),\ldots,merge(H_1,G_m),\ldots,merge(H_n,G_m)}$$

$$merge(\exists\overrightarrow{x_1}.P_1 \,\&\&\, \overrightarrow{B_1}, \exists\overrightarrow{x_2}.P_2 \,\&\&\, \overrightarrow{B_2}) = \exists\overrightarrow{x_1 x_2}.(P_1 \,\&\&\, P_2) \,\&\&\, \overrightarrow{B_1 B_2}$$

Figure 17: Normalization procedure.

$$\mathcal{V}(z,C) = (z,C) \qquad \mathcal{V}(v_l,C) = (v_l,C) \qquad \mathcal{V}(\texttt{sizeof}(t),C) = (\mathsf{sizeof}(t),C) \qquad \mathcal{V}(\&e,C) = \mathcal{A}(e,C)$$

$$\frac{\mathcal{V}(e,C) = (e',C')}{\mathcal{V}(\odot e,C) = (\odot e',C')} \qquad \frac{\mathcal{V}(e_1,C) = (e_1',C') \qquad \mathcal{V}(e_2,C') = (e_2',C'')}{\mathcal{V}(e_1 \oplus e_2,C) = (e_1' \oplus e_2',C'')}$$

$$\frac{\mathcal{V}(e_1,C) = (e_1',C_1) \qquad \cdots \qquad \mathcal{V}(e_n,C_{n-1}) = (e_n',C_n)}{\mathcal{V}(f(e_1,\ldots,e_n),C) = (f(e_1',\ldots,e_n'),C_n)} \qquad \frac{\mathcal{A}(e,C) = (a,L,S,x) \qquad a \in \mathrm{dom}(S)}{\mathcal{V}(e,C) = (S(a),L,S,x)}$$

$$\frac{\mathcal{A}(e,C) = (a,L,S,x) \qquad a \notin \mathrm{dom}(S) \qquad v \;\mathsf{fresh}}{\mathcal{V}(e,C) = (v,L,S\{a \mapsto v\},x \cup \{v\})} \qquad \mathcal{A}(*e,C) = \mathcal{V}(e,C) \qquad \mathcal{A}(e_1\,[e_2\,],C) = \mathcal{V}(e_1{+}e_2,C)$$

$$\frac{\mathcal{A}(e,C) = (e',C')}{\mathcal{A}(e\,.\,m,C) = (e' + \mathsf{offset}(m),C')} \qquad \frac{\mathcal{V}(e,C) = (e',C')}{\mathcal{A}(e{-}{>}m,C) = (e' + \mathsf{offset}(m),C')} \qquad \frac{v_p \in \mathrm{dom}(L)}{\mathcal{A}(v_p,L,S,x) = (L(v_p),L,S,x)}$$

$$\frac{v_p \notin \mathrm{dom}(L) \qquad a \;\mathsf{fresh}}{\mathcal{A}(v_p,L,S,x) = (a,L\{v_p \mapsto a\},S,x \cup \{a\})}$$

$$\frac{\mathcal{T}(P,\{\},\{\},\{\}) = (P',C) \qquad \mathcal{T}(\overrightarrow{B},C) = (\overrightarrow{B'},L,S,y)}{\mathcal{T}(\exists\overrightarrow{x}.P \,\&\&\, \overrightarrow{B}) = \exists x_1,\ldots,x_n,y_1,\ldots,y_m.L \wedge P' \ast_i B_i' \ast_{a \in \mathrm{dom}(S)} a \mapsto S(a)} \qquad \mathcal{T}(\overrightarrow{H}) = \bigvee \overrightarrow{\mathcal{T}(H)}$$

Figure 18: Expression conversion.

memory safety are shown here. In this program, `connt→conn_list` is a linked list of servers to connect to. To describe the memory structure related to this linked list, we introduce two predicates: `ConnListrep` and `ConnListseg`. These predicates are defined as follows:

```
ConnListrep(x) := x == 0 && emp ||
    ∃ n l num mark_v length,
      0 ⩽ n && n < 128 && l[n] == 0 &&
      x → num_packet == num &&
      x → mark == mark_v &&
      x → lengthsofar == length &&
      store_char_array(&(x→key), 128, l) *
      ConnListrep(x → next)

ConnListseg(x,y) := x == y && emp ||
    ∃ n l num mark_v length,
      0 ⩽ n && n < 128 && l[n] == 0 &&
      x → num_packet == num &&
      x → mark == mark_v &&
      x → lengthsofar == length &&
      store_char_array(&(x→key), 128, l) *
      ConnListseg(x → next, y)
```

In this definition, `store_char_array` corresponds to `chars` in Figure 4, representing a character array. This is purely a recursive definition describing the server list.

```
1  #include "bpf.h"
2
3  struct connection{
4      char key[128];
5      unsigned int num_packet;
6      unsigned int mark;
7      unsigned int lengthsofar;
8      struct connection * next;
9  };
10
11 struct identifier{
12     int mark;
13     char  name[32];
14     char  pattern[512];
15 };
16
17 struct conntrack{
18     int queuenum;
19     int iden_num;
20     struct identifier *iden_array;
21     struct connection *conn_list;
22 };
23
24 struct connection * get_connection
25     (struct conntrack * connt, char * key)
26 /*@ With n0 m0 l0 Connlist
27     Require 0 ⩽ n0 && l0[n0] == 0 && n0 < m0 &&
28         connt → conn_list == Connlist &&
29         store_char_array(key, m0, l0) *
30         ConnListrep(Connlist)
31     Ensure ∃ v, __return == v && TT
32 */
33 {
34     struct connection * p ;
35     if(connt == NULL || key == NULL)
36         return NULL;
37     p = connt→conn_list;
38     /*@ Inv
39         0 ⩽ n0 && l0[n0] == 0 && n0 < m0 &&
40         connt → conn_list == Connlist &&
41         store_char_array(key, m0, l0) *
42         ConnListrep(p) * ConnListseg(Connlist, p)
43     */
44     while(p != NULL){
45         if(strcmp(p→key , key) == 0)
46             break;
47         p = p→next;
48     }
49     if(p == NULL)
50         return NULL;
51     else
52         return p;
53 }
```

Figure 19: Annotated Key_connection

Programs		Code Lines	Linux verifier		PREVAIL	
			Time(ms)	Memory(KB)	Time(ms)	Memory(KB)
Linux Samples	sockex1_kern	29	1.03	4194	2.05	4978
	syscall_tp_kern(enter)	38	1.03	4194	3.17	4931
	cpustat_kern(frequency)	93	1.13	4190	11.30	6377
	cpustat_kern(idle)	116	1.11	4196	23.52	7918
	xdp_adjust_tail_kern	47	0.64	4196	6.69	5539
	syscall_tp_kern(exit)	35	0.99	4190	3.02	4927
	lathist_kern(on)	77	1.09	4144	10.18	6025
	trace_event_kern	65	fail	-	48.37	6730
	tcp_iw_kern	68	0.65	4152	9.82	5664
	tcp_rwnd_kern	50	0.77	4155	6.69	5404
PREVAIL Samples	twomaps	34	fail	-	2.43	5056
	twotypes	33	fail	-	3.80	5278
	map_in_map	36	fail	-	5.17	5054
	stackok	13	1.02	4114	74.67	5279
	loop	21	fail	-	fail	-
	packet_start_ok	14	1.08	4200	1.19	4942
	twostackvars	47	0.53	4140	20.9	5267
	packet_access	28	0.58	4153	2.74	5216
	bpf2bpf	13	0.51	4154	0.16	4157
	dependent_read	13	0.55	4154	fail	-
Stringlib	strcpy	34	fail	-	fail	-
	strncpy	34	1.65	4212	fail	-
	strcat	44	fail	-	fail	-
	strncat	43	fail	-	fail	-
	strlen	19	fail	-	fail	-
	strncmp	31	2.69	4316	fail	-
	strcmp	32	fail	-	fail	-
	memset	28	1.14	5168	39.89	7267
	strchr	28	fail	-	fail	-
	memchr	28	fail	-	fail	-
Unsafe Program	badhelpercall	6	reject	-	reject	-
	badmapptr	24	reject	-	reject	-
	badrelo	20	reject	-	reject	-
	ctxoffset	21	reject	-	reject	-
	nullmapref	23	reject	-	reject	-
	badhelpercall2	22	reject	-	reject	-
	packet_overflow	14	reject	-	reject	-
	wronghelper	20	reject	-	reject	-
	mapunderflow	23	reject	-	reject	-
	packet_reallocate	22	reject	-	reject	-
Key_connection		63	fail	-	fail	-

Table 4: Time cost and memory usage of samples by Linux verifier and PREVAIL

Programs		Asrt Lines	VEP-C		VEP-compiler	VEP-eBPF	
			Time(ms)	Memory(KB)	Time(ms)	Time(ms)	Memory(KB)
Linux Samples	sockex1_kern	3	4.06	5882	0.35	2.53	2284
	syscall_tp_kern(enter)	7	5.33	6391	0.37	2.57	2396
	cpustat_kern(frequency)	11	50.33	15887	2.62	7.89	4292
	cpustat_kern(idle)	11	158.12	32569	6.09	21.32	7167
	xdp_adjust_tail_kern	10	4.27	5852	0.32	2.41	2236
	syscall_tp_kern(exit)	7	5.28	6396	0.35	2.47	2379
	lathist_kern(on)	9	23.47	18502	2.47	21.69	8034
	trace_event_kern	6	67.33	18841	1.15	5.79	3353
	tcp_iw_kern	6	12.57	12150	1.75	9.11	4182
	tcp_rwnd_kern	6	63.88	19154	1.84	8.44	4342
PREVAIL Samples	twomaps	2	6.07	7119	0.46	2.77	2521
	twotypes	4	15.49	8288	0.73	4.40	2665
	map_in_map	3	2.97	5995	0.39	2.31	2348
	stackok	4	4.32	5223	0.19	1.96	2028
	loop	8	10.02	7682	0.55	2.84	2453
	packet_start_ok	3	2.64	5174	0.21	2.03	2126
	twostackvars	12	40.23	12422	1.43	3.96	3047
	packet_access	3	8.85	7075	0.50	3.42	2659
	bpf2bpf	7	0.70	4436	0.11	1.76	1932
	dependent_read	3	2.56	4920	0.19	2.14	2106
Stringlib	strcpy	9	12.09	8172	0.66	2.67	2510
	strncpy	11	8.69	7888	0.59	2.61	2557
	strcat	17	31.17	11778	1.39	3.41	2907
	strncat	17	36.60	12612	1.16	3.54	2970
	strlen	9	5.02	5946	0.29	2.23	2236
	strncmp	11	8.45	7994	0.54	2.58	2470
	strcmp	9	14.27	8528	0.76	2.25	2574
	memset	11	3.78	6271	0.35	2.18	2281
	strchr	9	6.94	6962	0.40	1.66	2463
	memchr	9	7.64	6683	0.42	3.19	2517
Unsafe Program	badhelpercall	4	reject	-	-	-	-
	badmapptr	3	reject	-	-	-	-
	badrelo	3	reject	-	-	-	-
	ctxoffset	3	reject	-	-	-	-
	nullmapref	3	reject	-	-	-	-
	badhelpercall2	4	reject	-	-	-	-
	packet_overflow	3	reject	-	-	-	-
	wronghelper	3	reject	-	-	-	-
	mapunderflow	3	reject	-	-	-	-
	packet_reallocate	3	reject	-	-	-	-
Key_connection		17	16.24	8534	0.56	2.48	2440

Table 5: Time cost and memory usage of samples by VEP